Fordham Law Review
Volume 87

Issue 3

Article 7

2018

Essay: Developing Appropriate Standards for Achieving Diversity
in Faculty Appointments
Guido Calabresi
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Legal Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Guido Calabresi, Essay: Developing Appropriate Standards for Achieving Diversity in Faculty
Appointments, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 959 (2018).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss3/7

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

ESSAY: DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE
STANDARDS FOR ACHIEVING DIVERSITY IN
FACULTY APPOINTMENTS
Guido Calabresi*
I am writing today to talk about diversity within law school faculties. And
when I say “diversity,” I mean all sorts of diversities, not just the ones that
most of those who address the issue tend to focus on. I have, for many years,
been thinking about the different types of diversities that seem crucial to a
law school, and the appropriate ways of achieving them.
Part I lists the categories of diversity that I think are important to
considering diversity within law school faculties. It then indicates a problem
that inheres with this list. Part II suggests how different schools may view
the appropriateness of achieving some of these diversities. And finally, in
Part III, I will come to the main thesis of this piece and propose how schools
can achieve the diversities they deem desirable.
I. CATEGORIES OF DIVERSITY
I have come up with eight categories of diversity to be considered in hiring
law school faculty. The eight types of diversity I will discuss in this paper
are:
1. age diversity: young and old;
2. teacher and scholar diversity: people who are primarily teachers and
people who are primarily writers;
3. subject matter diversity: Tax Law, Tort Law, and so on;
4. theory and practice diversity: theoreticians and clinicians, for instance;
5. diversity in theory of law: natural law, “critical” approaches to law, legal
realism, “law and . . .” , and so on;
6. diversity in approach to the law: whatever one’s theory of law may be,
connecting law primarily to history, philosophy, economics, or some other
extralegal field;
* Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Former Dean, Sterling
Professor Emeritus of Law, and Professorial Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School. This Essay
was prepared for the Symposium entitled Legal Education in Twentieth-Century America,
held at New York University’s Villa La Pietra conference center in Florence, Italy, on July 2–
4, 2018. For an overview of the Symposium, see Matthew Diller, Foreword: Legal Education
in Twentieth-Century America, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 859 (2018). An earlier version of the
views I express here was given as a talk at a meeting of the American Association of Law
Schools more years ago than I can remember.
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7. personal-characteristic diversity: this is the one most talked about and
includes gender and gender identity, race, sexual orientation, and religion
(this type of diversity is related to, but a little different from, the age
diversity mentioned above); and
8. finally, ideological diversity.
A problem that inheres with this list is that there might be what we could
call a ninth category of diversities: the diversity that results from the
overlapping of diverse characteristics. Some overlap is inevitable because
people rarely bring just one characteristic to the table. Take, for example, a
faculty member who is a conservative lawyer-historian who teaches Family
Law. This faculty member contributes an ideological position, an approach
to law, and a focus on a particular subject matter. But is this type of
“combined” diversity significant? What would that school lose if the
conservative historian taught another subject and a liberal noninterdisciplinarian taught Family Law? Does the school need both? Another
school may have an African American female economist who teaches
Intellectual Property, a gender-nonconforming historian who teaches Local
Law, and a moderate law and economics octogenarian teaching Tort Law.
These overlapping diversities are terrific. But what does each characteristic
add to the school? Would it matter, for example, if the economist was a
philosopher instead?
Some overlap cannot be achieved: old and young (I try, but it does not
work). Some overlap is universally desired. We all want to have a teacher
who is a truly good scholar and a scholar who is a good teacher. But, I
suggest there is no special diversity served by having someone on the faculty
who is both. There are some overlaps in diversity that matter more than
others. For example, it may be important to have both a conservative and a
liberal constitutional law professor, but is it also important to have a
conservative and a liberal antitrust professor? Is it worth going out of one’s
way to have a Roman Catholic African American female on the faculty? That
would be a very interesting diversity. But how significant in terms of
diversity is it? How many of these overlaps become a unique diversity,
desirable in its own right? It is not an easy question to answer, but one worth
considering. For the purpose of this Essay, however, I will focus on my
original eight listed diversities.
II. HOW LAW SCHOOLS VALUE DIVERSITIES
The next question is, how much diversity, and of what sort, does a law
school want or need?
Yale Law School in the 1930s thought of itself as a legal realist school.1
That is what it was; it did not care terribly much about having other legal
theories represented. It is said that Professor Myres McDougal was sent off
to Illinois by then Professor and eventual Dean Wesley Sturges because it

1. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986).
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was not clear that “Mac” was enough of a legal realist.2 He had, after all,
come to Yale from Oxford University.3 And only when he had supposedly
proven himself did Dean Charles Clark bring him back.4 That is what Yale
was at that time. While it was a very interesting law school, it was not truly
a great law school.
Similarly, other law schools have advertised their lack of diversity in
theory or approaches to law. Antonin Scalia School of Law at George Mason
University has described itself as a school that specializes in law and
economics, a very particular kind of thing.5 And there are some schools that
specialize in the “practice of law,” saying that this is what they do.6 Other
schools purport to focus on particular fields. Vermont Law School, for a long
time, specialized in environmental law and advertised itself specifically to
people who were interested in environmental law.7 A school may well and
properly want to specialize. But I do not think that a law school can so limit
itself and be truly great.
Nevertheless, it is not necessary for my discussion that all schools treat
diversity the same way. Even great law schools will define diversity
differently. Somebody once said that Yale Law School thinks it is furthering
diversity by having seven or eight different people teaching Freedom of
Speech in 1920 because each of them look at the issues involved differently.
I do think the one thing most law schools seem to agree on is that they
must have subject matter diversity. And it is kind of interesting to me how
important that seems to them. But the one kind of diversity the American
Association of Law Schools (AALS) expressly requires is not subject matter
diversity but personal-characteristic diversity.8 The AALS speaks of
personal-characteristic diversity as something that is an essential part of a
law school and makes it relevant to accreditation.9
So, while I think that all great law schools want to be highly diverse in all
eight categories previously listed, it remains up to each school to decide the
2. BONNIE COLLIER, A CONVERSATION WITH MYRES S. MCDOUGAL 6 (2013),
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=ylsohs
[https://perma.cc/CV7A-VY4R].
3. See id. at 4.
4. See id. at 6.
5. Henry N. Butler, A Message from the Dean, GEO. MASON U. ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH.,
https://www.law.gmu.edu/about/dean/ [https://perma.cc/8VHQ-BGB8] (last visited Nov. 15,
2018); see also Todd J. Zywicki, Keynote Address: Is There a George Mason School of Law
and Economics?, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 543, 543 (2014).
6. See, e.g., Our Programs, PACE ELISABETH HAUB SCH. L., https://law.pace.edu
[https://perma.cc/WL5K-8WKE] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (stating that the school offers “a
unique path to practice curriculum”).
7. Environmental Law Specialization, VT. L. SCH., https://www.vermontlaw.edu/
academics/specializations/environmental-law [https://perma.cc/ZS29-UMPZ] (last visited
Nov. 15, 2018).
8. Bylaws, ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, https://www.aals.org/about/handbook/bylaws/
[https://perma.cc/QF3B-K3QG] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“A member school shall seek to
have a faculty, staff, and student body which are diverse with respect to race, color, and sex.”).
9. See generally Diversity, Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action, ASS’N AM. L.
SCHOOLS, https://www.aals.org/about/handbook/good-practices/diversity/ [https://perma.cc/
H4S2-QLNX] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
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crucial details. Different schools will have different views as to how many
of these matter, which are the most important, and which combinations really
matter in making a law school what it wants to be.
III. APPROPRIATE STANDARDS
We come then to the main point of this paper: What are the appropriate
standards for faculty appointments to attain diversity?
If you ask almost any law school what the standard for appointment is, the
school will answer “excellence.”10 It will say, we appoint people who are
excellent. Now, the first thing to realize is that the measure of “excellence”
differs widely from school to school. For example, to be considered excellent
at Yale is to be someone who has a real chance of breaking paradigms.11
That is quite different from what is considered excellent at Harvard. Harvard
seems to want somebody who dominates a field and pushes it further.12 Now,
it may be that a school like Yale has a comparative advantage in trying to get
paradigm breakers and Harvard a comparative advantage in getting people
who are genuinely original in moving a field further (without worrying about
whether they completely redo it). This advantage may be why these schools
in practice define excellence as they do. I tend to think so. And other law
schools will likewise define excellence in line with their vision of
themselves.
In the end, excellence probably means what makes a particular school look
good in relation to its competitors. For example, an appointment may meet
a school’s excellence standard if its competitors will say “damn good
appointment.” But all of this shows just how different “excellence” really is.
More crucially, what is considered excellent also differs within every
school. It is not a unitary standard. And anyone who thinks that it is a
consistent standard should go back and look at appointments that have been
made in any given school. Such a look will readily show just how different
that standard has been in practice.
For example, a school may have a subject matter that is oversubscribed,
meaning the school already has a large number of people teaching that
subject. This oversubscription does not mean the school will never make an
appointment in that area, but the appointment will have to be a superstar.
And that is different from mere excellence.
This is true even in a place like Yale that claims it does not slot-fill. When
it comes to the ninth person who wants to teach Constitutional Theory of the
10. See Law School Hiring, FAC. LOUNGE, http://www.thefacultylounge.org/
law_school_hiring/ [https://perma.cc/8EGY-7A3B] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
11. See Our Faculty, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/faculty?combine=
&field_type_value=Faculty [https://perma.cc/N8KU-XVUU] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018)
(noting that the faculty of Yale Law School is comprised of “prominent scholars” and “leading
specialists”).
12. See John F. Manning, Dean’s Welcome, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/
about/deans-welcome [https://perma.cc/GV4D-LZNM] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“HLS
combines genuine excellence and wonderful diversity on a scale that is unmatched anywhere.
No law school has done more to shape law or legal education.”).
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First Amendment in the 1920s, it is not that Yale will not make that
appointment. But to be appointed, such a scholar has to be much more than
the excellent kind of person Yale normally goes after. Law schools are not
as rigid on this as arts and science departments, where if a field, broadly
defined, is full, there will be no room except for someone who is even more
than a superstar. Great law schools tend to have more flexibility. And yet,
at some point, even they change their standards.
For this paper, though, what is more important in terms of the application
of different standards is what happens when a school is trying to achieve
diversity. Let me give you an example. Many years ago, George Mason—
holding itself out as a law and economics school—stated that it would not
appoint someone who did not have a doctorate in economics. That was a
crucial part of its standard of excellence. However, it appointed a tax guy
who not only did not have a doctorate in economics, but who had never really
studied economics. I asked about this appointment and the answer I received
was “we can’t not have a tax person.” That is, subject matter diversity was
so important that the school was willing, seemingly without even thinking
deeply about it, to deviate from its usual standard.
When I was on an AALS accreditation committee, George Mason was
being questioned about its lack of women and African American faculty
members. The school’s answer was that there were very few women and
African American lawyers who also had a doctorate in economics. I then
said: “But you’re willing to do it for tax. Why are you not willing to do it
for these diversities? In effect, you are telling me that one diversity is more
important to you than another. I’m not saying this can’t be valid, but I want
you to justify it in terms of your school’s vision of itself and the AALS’s
requirements.”
In fact, it seemed to me then (and still seems to me) that George Mason
had it exactly backward. A school can deal with subject matter diversity by
appointing visiting lecturers to cover the field for a time. But it cannot deal
with personal-characteristic diversity in the same way. Visiting lecturers
help to some extent. But they do not supply personal-characteristic diversity
in the same way as having a regular, tenured faculty member.
The representative from George Mason did not answer my question at the
time, and I soon after left the committee, so I do not know what ultimately
happened. But the school was clearly applying different standards in
different situations.
The most important difference in standards that law schools apply is the
difference between the standard for promoting junior faculty to tenured
positions and the standard for hiring professors laterally to tenured positions.
I do not think that there is a school in the country that does not have a much
easier standard for promotion than it does for making lateral appointments.
We sometimes deny that this is so at Yale, but it is true there too.
Every single law school I know of has a different standard, and there is
good reason for it. Thus, when you appoint a junior, if you are at a place like
Yale, you hope that the junior will be a paradigm breaker, someone who is a
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“genius.” You try to get that person early because it is much harder to get
such a person laterally. So you look for the juniors who may become the
Akhil Amars, the James Forman Jrs., or the Harold Kohs of their field. You
look for them and you hire them without tenure. Some of those that you hire
young turn out to be paradigm breakers, and, inevitably, others turn out “just”
to be damn good, wonderful teachers, scholars, and citizens, but not people
whom you would go out and try to steal from other places.
So, what is one going to do? Not promote those who turned out to be just
fine, but not paradigm breakers? If a school does that, it will not be able to
get any of the juniors it originally wanted to get. Why should a promising
junior take the risk? And, perhaps even more importantly, if a school fails to
promote them, it will destroy its faculty’s collegiality. Both of these are very
good reasons for having a different standard, and we all take them for granted
and employ a different standard. But, in fact, these are no better reasons to
have a different standard than the need to have diversity.13
In other words, having a different standard in promoting juniors than in
making lateral tenure appointments is justified because it helps a school. But
so does diversifying. Why, then, should we not apply the promotion standard
to lateral appointments that give us any of the diversities I listed?
And that is of course the thesis of this paper. I believe that, as to six of the
eight diversities that I listed, a school should apply a promotion standard to
get diversity by hiring laterally. And I also believe that no one can justifiably
say to a school that applying a promotion standard is going below its standard
of excellence to get diversity. The school is simply applying a standard that
it regularly employs. And it is doing so for a reason that is very, very good.
I have said that I would apply this modified lateral standard—the
promotion standard—in order to further six of the eight types of diversity I
have listed. Which are the two that I would not treat that way?
The first is theory and practice diversity. There, my standard is separate
but equal. Separate but equal—I use that pejorative-laden phrase
intentionally to cause people to worry. It is both something that I think is
worth doing in that area and it causes the problems that separate but equal
always causes. As I will discuss, though, I think those problems can be dealt
with.
The other area in which I would not apply the modified standard may well
be highly controversial. I do not think one should apply a more favorable
standard in order to get ideological diversity. I do believe that ideological
diversity is every bit as important as the others, but I have reasons for
concluding that one probably should not deviate from the ordinary lateral
appointment standard in this area. I will discuss them shortly.
13. It is sometimes said that the difference between a promotion and a lateral-appointment
standard is that a faculty knows some relevant facts—such as teaching ability—when it
promotes, but takes a risk as to these facts with lateral appointments. And so, the faculty is
justified in requiring more as to what is known (i.e., quality of scholarship) in the latter. That
may well be an additional “good reason,” though it can be diminished by having laterals be
appointed only after having a visiting appointment.
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As to the others, personal-characteristic and age diversity, subject matter,
teacher-scholar, theories of law, and approach to law, I would apply the
promotion standard to lateral appointments that would further diversity.
It is interesting that those people who are big on applying a more favorable
standard to achieve subject matter diversity, and will do it in that area without
thinking about it (and will do it also to further diversity in theories and
approaches to law), are often the people who are most opposed to doing
something analogous to achieve personal-characteristic diversity.
Conversely, those who are most willing to apply a favorable standard to
achieve diversity in personal characteristics (and will do it also to further
diversity in theories and approaches to law) are least interested in anything
of the sort where it would serve to get actual subject matter diversity. I do
not know what it is that causes people, individual teachers, to break in that
way. My own view, though, is that they are both wrong because all of these
diversities are essential to being a truly great law school.
There are obviously problems, legal problems, with respect to each. The
right-wing equal protectionists contend that one cannot favor personalcharacteristic diversity. I never bought that position, but it is certainly being
argued today. Age diversity obviously runs into Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) problems.14 On the other hand, I do believe there
is a great advantage in not just having octogenarian torts teachers. The
AALS, instead, is much more concerned, and understandably so, with
personal-characteristic diversity.15 And it does suggest that accreditation
may depend on achieving it. It may also look to subject matter diversity. But
the AALS does not worry terribly much about the other forms of diversity.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has recently paid a great deal of
attention to practice, as against theory, diversity. But, all these legal and
organizational pressures, although important, are not the topic of this piece.
Before I turn to why I would treat two of my eight diversities differently
from the others, it may be worthwhile to spend a little time on why I treat
theory of law and approach to law separately, and each as demanding
attention. I think that there really is a difference in the theory of law that one
has—natural law, legal process, formalism, “law and . . .”—and that a great
school should want diversity of such theories. But I also believe a great
school should seek people who look at different theories of law from the
perspective of different outside disciplines. One should not want all “law
and . . .” people to be law and economics scholars or legal philosophers.
Similarly, one does not want all critical legal theorists or legal realists to be
historians of law or sociologists.
I have two stories that speak to the point. When I became Dean of Yale
Law School in 1985, I told my faculty colleagues at Yale, which at the time
was having some trouble hiring, that we were going to do a lot of good hiring.
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012).
15. See Recruitment and Retention of Minority Law Faculty Members, ASS’N AM. L.
SCHOOLS,
https://www.aals.org/about/handbook/good-practices/minority-law-facultymembers [https://perma.cc/5JHW-62RZ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
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I knew I would be good at it and that I would be able to get the money to do
it. I also told them that the first ones we would appoint would probably all
be law and economics people, with different theories of law and in different
subject matter areas, but all economics oriented. I said this because I believed
that, given the school’s and my own strength, we could hire the very best in
legal education who approached law that way. And we did. But I also told
my colleagues: “do not worry, when we have demonstrated that we can hire
the best, that we no longer have problems in hiring, we will be right back
with philosophers, historians, and all other ‘-ologists.’” And so we did.
My other tale has to do with my own scholarly history. When in 1965, I,
already having tenure, was writing The Costs of Accidents,16 I was invited by
Konrad Zweigert, then the God of European law, to the Max Planck Institute
in Hamburg to explain what I was doing. I went there and I talked about my
work. At the end of my presentation, Zweigert leaned forward and said,
“That is very interesting, Calabresi, but you must realize that it is not law and
it is not legal scholarship.” I answered rather rudely, “It may not be now, but
it soon will be.” The two people on either side of him laughed. He looked
at them, as only a Herr Professor can, and they stopped in mid-laugh. But,
in time, each of them became head of the Max Planck. And, as I have often
said, what happened later is that law and economics not only became law and
legal scholarship, but to many scholars, in more than one university in the
United States, it became the only thing that was law and legal scholarship.
Having seen it both ways, I expect, is a reason why I believe that diversity in
approaches to law is crucial.
Of course, how much a school that is lacking any of these diversities can
do to broaden itself will depend on how much that school can afford.
Finances will also in part determine how particularized any school will be in
defining diversity: whether, in other words, the school will go beyond my
eight categories and worry about what I earlier termed a possible ninth
category, consisting of overlapping diversities. And this will be true as to
each of the diversities I have listed. For example, can a school afford to
define diversity so as to treat as different, and worth extra effort to have, an
African American woman because she is Catholic? Can a school afford to
treat having a scholar who teaches The First Amendment in 1920 and one
who teaches The First Amendment in 1950 as adding important subject
matter diversity? Both of these will depend on the school’s resources and
priorities. To the extent that a school can afford them, though, at least the
eight diversities I listed are all desirable and necessary. And to the extent
that a school can hire somebody who is teaching elsewhere, and whom the
school would promote were that person already on the faculty, then, I believe,
the school has a duty to try to make that appointment.
My focus in this Essay is on lateral appointments. I think it is less
important to focus as much on original, junior appointments. I believe that
each kind of diversity is more easily achieved as to original nontenured
16. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970).
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appointments, and, therefore, that no modification of standards is needed
there. Because society has broadened, it is now easier to make appointments
of juniors that have personal-characteristic diversity. The pool has become
much larger as past prejudices have diminished. That is, while our past
histories may narrow the pool of lateral candidates who are diverse in
personal characteristics, that history affects the pool for junior, original
appointees less. And, there is no reason to think that paradigm breakers (or
however a school defines excellence) cannot be found in the pool of diverse
juniors.
Similarly, junior appointees can be pushed into different subject matters.
That is the dean’s job. As a result, I think that as to the initial junior
appointments, the problem can be dealt with adequately without playing with
standards.
But lateral, senior appointments are crucial. A school is defined by the
people it has at the top, and hence its diversity is reflected in the degree of
diversity it has at the top. For these reasons, I have focused on the standards
schools should use to hire laterally.
*

*

*

I must now explain why I would not apply a promotion standard to lateral
hiring to achieve two of the eight listed diversities.
I would not do it as to theory and practice diversity because I think that the
skills there are sufficiently different that if a school tries to get somebody
who is a pretty good clinician and writes scholarly articles pretty well, it will
get someone who is likely to be mediocre on both counts. As a result, a
school should seek to get, as clinical teachers, the best available hands-on
practitioners who know what really good clinical work is. A school should
not worry about whether they have written a single damn thing. I feel the
same way as to theoreticians. If they are truly good theorists, the fact that
they have never set foot in a courtroom should not keep them from being
hired (and I am here being autobiographical of course, but any number of
great scholars like Bruce Ackerman will do as well). This approach will give
a school the best theoreticians available.
Great schools need both great practice-oriented teachers and top-flight
theoreticians. And both are readily available so long as one does not ask that
they be excellent in more than one of the two characteristics. Hence if we
keep clinical and academic appointments separate, there is no need to modify
standards. The way a school gets excellence in both is the way we have done
it at Yale Law School. Yale is the most theoretical of law schools
academically, but it also has the most hands-on clinical program. Its clinical
programs and its clinical professors are even more hands-on than NYU’s
(another school with a great clinical program). At Yale, precisely because
we are so theoretical on the academic side, we seek and succeed in getting
clinicians who are simply truly fine clinical practitioners.
This, of course, is a separate-but-equal approach to achieve diversity. And
any separate-but-equal approach creates problems because separate often
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means not equal. Moreover, in America, given our history of separate and
fiercely unequal treatment of African Americans, the very words “separate
but equal” sound infamous. Interestingly, this is not the case in Europe,
which, lacking our history, often reacts quite positively to such approaches.
Still we have to live and deal with all that separate but equal connotes here.
To make matters worse, separateness that is not equal has frequently been
a problem with the way clinicians have been treated in law schools. The only
way a school can make such an approach work is if that school is genuine
about equality. The school must truly recognize that clinicians are as
important to the school and should be treated as well as the theorists. I
consider this one of my great achievements as dean. I made the salary of the
clinicians equivalent to the salaries of top academic professors. I got “Named
Chairs” for clinicians and gave them sabbaticals. I made their views
dominant in the making of all clinical appointments. As a result, clinicians
now get treated with as much respect as all others on the faculty.
There are many places where separate but equal in this area has not
worked. So it is dangerous. But I believe that if one is really serious about
equality, separate but equal can work in this area. Of course, it works best
when one gets some individuals who are genuinely good at both practice and
theory. In that case, the school should gladly recognize that fact and appoint
them to both categories. They become both clinical professors and academic
professors. Yale has recently done that as to James Forman, Jr.17 He is
clearly top-of-the-line under Yale’s “excellence” standard for both. Such an
occasional union of practice and theory serves to emphasize the respect given
to both, and thereby to make separate-but-equal treatment succeed.
And so I come to what I think is the most controversial diversity area:
ideology. Let me start by emphasizing what I said earlier. I believe that
ideological difference is as important in a law school as each of the other
kinds of diversity I listed. Lawyers are not mathematicians and it is very
important that there be law school teachers who are far right, far left, far
center, far this, far that, and far the other. This is essential if we are going to
give our students the kind of legal education they need. So why not say that
schools should further ideological diversity in the same way that I urge in
other diversities? I have two reasons.
The first is the impression I have that, if a school self-consciously tries to
hire people laterally because of their ideological differences, that school will
tend to create factions in the faculty. Self-consciously seeking the other
characteristics does not seem to do that.
Appointment decisions are the most heated ones that faculties make. They
are what faculties get the most mad about, and they can result in losing
important faculty members. Yale lost Grant Gilmore for a number of years
because he was mad about an appointment. But losing even the most
important faculty members, while costly, can be overcome. Creating factions

17. James Forman, Jr., YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/james-forman-jr
[https://perma.cc/S2SY-Z585] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
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that solidify destroys a school. Still, the dean can do a lot in most
appointment situations to avoid the creation of factions.
The dean has a fair amount of control over the timing of appointment
discussions, and can use that control to reduce the chances of faculty factions
being created. I used to do this all the time. Assume I had an appointment
coming up, about which I knew that Robin and John fiercely opposed each
other. It seemed likely that they would walk out of the meeting with Robin
saying something like: “John is a blankety-blank scoundrel, conniving,
cheating, etc.” And John might be saying the same about her. They might
even go out and slam doors, shouting at each other. (Once, before I became
dean, I walked down the halls after an appointments meeting slamming doors
and shouting at Tony Kronman. We were screaming at each other because
of an appointment we disagreed about.) As dean, I would make sure that the
next appointment that came up was one in which Robin and John were on the
same side, so they would come out marveling at how wise, how thoughtful,
how careful, the other was, while getting mad at someone else. As a result,
factions did not form. (Similarly, Tony Kronman and I remained good
friends after that incident. And I was delighted to have him succeed me as
dean).
My experience has been, however, that when a faculty focuses on ideology
directly, it is very difficult to avoid the creation of permanent splits. And so,
direct attention to ideology is dangerous. It would still be worth doing,
however, if there were not ways of achieving ideological diversity indirectly.
I believe there are.
My contention, and I am not 100 percent happy with it, is that if a faculty
is genuinely concerned with subject matter, approach, and theory diversity,
then it will get an adequate amount of ideological diversity as well. How this
works will differ over time. In the 1930s, constitutionalists were by and large
conservative,18 while antitrust people were on the left.19 If a faculty was
careful to have both fields well covered, it was likely also to cover “left” and
“right.” The same would be true as to theories of law. In the United States
in the 1930s, formalists were conservative20 and “law and . . .” people were
“dangerous” lefties.21 Such correlations change, of course. Thus, in the
1970s, constitutionalists were often lefties,22 and antitrust teachers were
frequently righties.23 Similarly, “law and . . .” theorists in the 1970s often
were conservatives.24
18. See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV.
641, 665–67 (1990).
19. See Edward O. Correia, Antitrust and Liberalism, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 99, 109 (1995)
(citing John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, 32 J. PHIL. 225, 225–27 (1935)).
20. See Ofer Raban, Between Formalism and Conservatism: The Resurgent Legal
Formalism of the Roberts Court, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 343, 344–46 (2014).
21. See Justin Desautels-Stein, A Context for Legal History, or, This Is Not Your Father’s
Contextualism, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 29, 32–33 (2016).
22. See Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skoller, The Future of Liberal Legal
Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 189, 189 (1988).
23. See Correia, supra note 19, at 102–03.
24. See Desautels-Stein, supra note 21, at 33.
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When a faculty diversifies as to subject matter, theory, or approach to law,
it is not making appointments that are strictly ideological. The greatest of
the legal realists, Arthur Corbin, was a conservative and still was fully a legal
realist.25 And a pretty good law and economics guy, Guido Calabresi, was
something of a lefty at a time when most law and economics scholars were
not. If all of this is so, my contention is that a faculty that is really serious
about achieving diversity in subject matter, theory, and approach to law will
get an adequate amount of ideological diversity as well. And significantly,
it will get that without having the particular focus on ideology that I think is
destructive. Because of the semi-hemi-demi-correlation, it does not work out
badly. And these diversities will also bring about ideological diversity.
There is a problem, though. How should we define ideological difference?
If ideological difference, to be sufficient, is not simply membership on a
faculty as a whole, but must also be ideological difference within particular
fields, my approach may not work. For example, in the 1980s, Yale Law
School had any number of conservatives on the faculty. But they were almost
all lawyer-economists. And many were teaching antitrust. Somebody could
have properly said, Yale does not have a single constitutional law
conservative on its faculty. My approach might lead only to such an
inadequate result. If it is important to have diversity within subject matter
fields, within theory, and within legal approach, my indirect way may well
fail.
But over time, the indirect approach may achieve even this more nuanced
ideological diversity. I do not think much of originalism, but it certainly is
an important current legal theory. And, by and large, originalists today tend
to be conservative. Moreover, they tend to be conservative as to
constitutional law. Once again, the correlation is not total. In a way, Hugo
Black was an originalist but he certainly was not a conservative. If a faculty
says, we ought to have some originalists on the faculty for diversity reasons,
and then uses the promotion standard to hire an originalist laterally, today
that faculty would likely also meet the abovementioned, more nuanced,
definition of ideological diversity.
I am not sure. And I guess if it did not work, I would be willing to face
the problem of ideological diversity head on because I think that such
diversity is truly important. But avoiding the risk of factions still makes me
hope that even the more nuanced—within field—ideological diversity can be
adequately achieved indirectly.
CONCLUSION
These then are my two exceptions to applying the promotion standard to
lateral appointments in order to achieve diversity. As to all the other types
of diversity, I see no excuse for not doing so. And because I see no excuse
for not doing it, I think there is a duty to employ that standard in such cases.
And I believe it to be a duty that applies across the board.
25. KALMAN, supra note 1, at 139–40.
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A “great” faculty can make do for a time—if it cannot find those who meet
even that standard—by appointing lecturers, visitors, and so on. But the
faculty should be aware that diversity is not achieved equally well as to
different diversity categories through the use of lecturers. One can achieve
some subject matter diversity by having a visiting lecturer teach bankruptcy.
But having an African American woman as a lecturer is nowhere near the
same with respect to personal-characteristic diversity as having such a person
there as a permanent member of the faculty.
There are some categories of diversity where substitutes will do more or
less for a while. There are others where they will not. But the aim as to all
ought to be permanent tenured lateral appointments at a standard that nobody
can properly criticize because it is a standard that the school applies all the
time in making promotions. And applying such a standard will allow a
faculty to be the kind of diverse institution that it believes it should be and
that any school that wants to be considered a great school must achieve.
That said, let me end by reiterating that while I have views as to what kinds
of diversity are important, my analysis of standards does not depend on those
views. In other words, each school will, and should, decide for itself what
kind of diversities matter to it. There is nothing inherently wrong with
George Mason wishing to define itself as a law and economics school, with
Yale in the 1930s viewing itself as a bastion of legal realism, or with a school
believing it should be primarily an environmental law or a practice of law
place. A “great” school may want more. But that is neither here nor there as
far as this Essay is concerned. My point is simply this: as to the kinds of
diversity a school decides it wants, or is in some sense required to have, there
are ways of achieving that diversity through careful adherence to standards,
but properly modified ones.
APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPT*
PRESIDENT EMERITUS JOHN SEXTON: In the present context, I am
certain that in your mind finding appropriate representatives of the black
community of America is more important than finding appropriate
representatives of the Italian community.
JUDGE GUIDO CALABRESI: Yes.
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON: So how would you elaborate what
your priority in categories would be?
JUDGE CALABRESI: I didn’t because I saw what is on the program for
this afternoon and figured it would be addressed then. I think it mattered for
a very long time that I was the only practicing Roman Catholic on the Yale
Law School faculty. Priority will change with time: I mean, when I came
on women were as or more important than African Americans because it was

* This discussion followed the author’s presentation of this Essay at the Symposium. The
transcript has been lightly edited. For a list of the Symposium participants, see Matthew
Diller, Foreword: Legal Education in Twentieth-Century America, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 859
(2018).
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such an outrage. Hispanics, crucially important now, were not as important
as African Americans, I think, because historically they are more like Italians
were before.
Steve Carter is for affirmative action but has said quite clearly that it cost
him something because some people have said: maybe you were appointed
because you were an African American.26 Maybe he was. I don’t know.
There’s no one smarter than Steve Carter on a plain intellectual level, and if
some people think he’s not smart . . . well, stupid them. And, by the way, if
affirmative action costs some people something—and it does—think of the
costs to those left out without it. Frankly, I don’t mind the costs to those
African Americans who were so brilliant they would make it regardless of
anything because they’ve got a lot going for them. And I feel that way
because of the affirmative action I received. You know, I got affirmative
action all the way through because Italians were just beginning to be
considered. I once wrote I saw no reason to give affirmative action to the
Yale-educated son of the Yale-educated Governor of Puerto Rico. I was
wrong and let me tell you why.
Do any of you know Frank Iacobucci,27 former dean of Toronto Law
School, president of Toronto University, one of the great Canadian scholars,
and a member of the Toronto Supreme Court? When I first met him he said:
“you know, Guido, I owe you a lot.” I said: “that’s interesting, we’ve never
met.” He said: “I was going to school at Toronto and fell in love with the
law. I told my parents I’m going to be a law professor. They said you can’t,
you’re an Italian Canadian.” (This was Toronto in the 1950s and 1960s, not
Toronto today.) “The next day I saw that Guido Calabresi had become
Professor of Law at Yale, the youngest in the school’s history, and I said, ‘if
it can happen to an Italian at Yale, it can happen to me in Toronto.’” My
own view is that this affirmative thing is much more about what we need than
anything about the individual.
PROFESSOR ROBIN WEST: Should there be a different standard
between what’s required for promotion from within and what’s required for
lateral appointments? When you promote from within you’re recognizing
not only that person’s accomplishments, but also that person’s emergence as
a full member of the community. When you bring in someone laterally that
person better be a superstar because we’re going to be stuck if the person
turns out to be a jerk.
JUDGE CALABRESI: Of course, it is more dangerous to make a lateral
appointment of any sort because you don’t know the person. My rubric as
dean was excellence but with humanity and decency, and that has always
been; I hope that’s on my tombstone. Yale’s tradition has been to make
lateral appointments only after the person has come as a visitor. And we have
26. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY
(1991).
27. The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, CC, QC, LLD, LSM, TORYS LLP,
https://www.torys.com/people/iacobucci-the-honourable-frank
[https://perma.cc/7ZGYHNSW] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
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almost always required a visit. During the time I was dean, we never made
an offer to a person while the person was a visitor that that visitor did not
accept. That is, the community thing works both ways—we were using it
both as a hiring tactic and as a way of getting to know them.
PROFESSOR WILLIAM NELSON: Two questions. It seems to me that
one of the great ideological issues of the day is whether personal-identity
diversity is good to have. And, have you thought about extending this to
student diversity as well as faculty diversity?
JUDGE CALABRESI: I have no doubt that personal-identity diversity is
one of the issues of the day. I have no doubt that there has been a campaign
of the racist Right to do this—to avoid integration—and on that I’m fierce
and ideologically committed. I think this is the South playing the South’s
game as it did after the Civil War and I have no patience with it. I do not
think there is anything against affirmative action in the language of due
process or the history of equal protection if you want to be an originalist.
Even my nephew, Steven Calabresi, believes that originalism in terms of
equal protection had affirmative action;28 you cannot look at it in any other
way. Personally, I got a lot of affirmative action as an Italian. It isn’t until
affirmative action starts being given to blacks that the whole fuss starts to
come out.
PROFESSOR DANIEL COQUILLETTE: When I was dean, the Asian
Pacific law student group came in and said they were worried because they
believed Boston College was trying to increase diversity by lumping together
African American, Asian American, and Latino applicants. They were
worried that as the number of Asian American applicants continued to
increase rapidly, the diversity standard would turn into a quota. The second
thing they said was that, while Asian American applicants shared racial
characteristics, we’re not the same. Some of us come from the wealthiest
families in America. They argued you have to look at us as being very
different.
I did not have a good answer at the tip of my tongue. All I could say was
that because of the way you look, all of you may suffer discrimination
because of your Asian background. They were not happy with that and they
were afraid of quotas. Looking now, Asian American enrollments are
growing29 and we don’t have enough Asian Americans on faculties.30 I
wondered what you have to say about that?
28. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v.
Board of Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429.
29. See Scott Jaschik, The Numbers and the Arguments on Asian Admissions, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2017/08/07/
look-data-and-arguments-about-asian-americans-and-admissions-elite [https://perma.cc/LQ
2V-R8GX] (noting that Asian Americans tend to “fare well beyond their numbers in admission
to top colleges”—with Asian Americans comprising 22 percent of Harvard University’s
freshman class in 2017 yet only making up about 5 percent of the population at public high
schools).
30. See James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013, 39
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 143 (2016).
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JUDGE CALABRESI: Now and for the next period of time, the notion
that there might be so many Asian Americans looking for faculty
appointments that it would hurt diversity to name all of them is not really
there. I do agree very much that how you lump people together is very
important. I’ve always been troubled by the fact that Filipinos, to their
tremendous disadvantage, tend to be lumped with Asian Americans rather
than with Hispanics, which in most ways historically is how they were treated
by the United States. The pressure with Asian American students to do the
equivalent of quotas is there, however, and I think we have to fight it.
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON: I want to add two angles that might
be helpful to thinking about this. There’s a book by Bill Bowen, former
president of Princeton, about admission of athletes to elite colleges. His data
revealed that 40 percent of the men admitted to Amherst and Williams were
admitted by coaches without reference to the admissions committee.31 Data
for Harvard, Princeton, and Yale show very high SAT scores and class
standings for the general student body and completely separate, nonoverlapping data for the recruited athletes, who were also a less racially
diverse group than the general student body.32 People forget that every kid
on Long Island is playing lacrosse, tennis, or golf. People think of legacies
first, but the big scandal is around recruited athletes.
My second point is about subsidiaries. A key number in university budgets
is personnel: in most places, 60 percent of the overall budget is for personnel
and 40 percent of that is faculty, sometimes 50 percent. So when you’re
looking at these huge budgets, how you allocate your faculty resource money
is key and that depends on whether you believe the accounts being given to
you. When I sat in the Dean’s Council in the early 1990s, every dean claimed
that his or her school was excellent, and three-fourths of them were obviously
wrong. The danger is that B+ deans tend to appoint B- faculty; the best deans
are A- because they are not afraid to surround themselves with people better
than they are, A+ people. And this gets into this principle of subsidiarity.
One issue at NYU Law School was clinicians. Under Norman Dorsen’s
guidance, what we did at NYU was to make sure clinicians had the same
rights, the same compensation, the same dignity. They got to vote on
everything including tenure votes to the academic chamber as we called it,
but we counted the votes differently. It gave dignity.
PROFESSOR NELSON: But not power.
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON: Well, yes and no. It actually gave
power to the academic faculty over clinical appointments because you had to
get a majority of the whole faculty on an appointment or promotion matter
and two-thirds of your own chamber. So given the relative numbers that
made the academic faculty feel that they were still in control. But on
legislative matters, everybody voted equally.

31. See generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & SARAH A. LEVIN, RECLAIMING
COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2003).
32. Id. at 142.
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JUDGE CALABRESI: On athletics, I’m inclined to agree with you. It is
a scandal in any number of places. Back to law school, Yale admissions were
unusual because every file that got through a first cut—maybe 1500 to
2000—was read by three faculty members in piles of one hundred and given
a grade of four, three, two, or one. Children of alums got an extra point.
Everyone read one or two hundred files except the head of the admissions
committee, who was too busy, and the dean, who wasn’t trusted on
admissions. I got a call asking whether we could admit the son of the head
of the judiciary committee; my answer, I don’t do admissions. That we gave
an extra point was a useful thing to tell alums that we don’t care whether you
give money or have money, but we are a family and we do this openly. After
I stopped being dean the system was changed, and there is now more pressure
for some alum children who have connections and so on to get in.
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON: I will say that my predecessor at
NYU, Norman Redlich, was pure, even purer than you describe. I adopted a
different approach. We never sold a seat. I gave applicants I was interested
in a ranking of one, two, three, and four. What I wanted from the admissions
committee was an honest answer about whether the person could do the work.
If they could do the work, and admitting that student would create $20
million in financial aid, I would do it. We did not, in the case of that offer,
because the student was not good enough. But, if he had been judged by the
committee as sufficiently capable, we would have.
JUDGE CALABRESI: We would not, probably because we could afford
not to.
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON: Right. It’s easy to say.
JUDGE CALABRESI: We had an issue about whether the children of
faculty members who had gone to a law school other than Yale should receive
an extra point. In the end, Harry Wellington decided no. So we also stopped
giving the point to Yale graduates on the faculty. But what if the faculty
member’s wife was a Yale Law School graduate? Obviously the child got
the point.
PRESIDENT EMERITUS SEXTON: We gave the top, number one
ranking, during my time as dean to the child of anyone who had worked at
the Law School for more than ten years, and that included security guards,
janitors; so it ended up number one had some really great stories attached to
it that were highly defensible.

